The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the US (PDF)

THE FINAL REPORT AND

FINDINGS OF THE

SAFE SCHOOL

INITIATIVE:

IMPLICATIONS FOR

THE PREVENTION OF

SCHOOL ATTACKS IN

THE UNITED STATES

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 2004

THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS

OF THE

SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF

SCHOOL ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Bryan Vossekuil

Director

National Violence Prevention and Study Center

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.

Director

National Violence Prevention and Study Center

Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.

Chief Research Psychologist and Research Coordinator

National Threat Assessment Center

U.S. Secret Service

Randy Borum, Psy.D.

Associate Professor

University of South Florida

William Modzeleski

Associate Deputy Under Secretary

Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools

U.S. Department of Education

Washington, D. C.

June 2004

REFACE

iii

JOINT MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, AND THE DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE

Littleton, Colo.; Springfield, OR; West Paducah, KY; Jonesboro, AR. These

communities have become familiar to many Americans as the locations where school

shootings have occurred in recent years. School shootings are a rare, but significant,

component of school violence in America. It is clear that other kinds of problems

are far more common than the targeted attacks that have taken place in schools

across this country. However, each school-based attack has had a tremendous and

lasting effect on the school in which it occurred, the surrounding community, and the

nation as a whole. In the aftermath of these tragic events, educators, law

enforcement officials, mental health professionals, parents, and others have asked:

"Could we have known that these attacks were being planned?" and "What can be

done to prevent future attacks from occurring?"

In June 1999, following the attack at Columbine High School, our two agencies--the

U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education--launched a collaborative

effort to begin to answer these questions. The result was the

Safe School Initiative,

an extensive examination of 37 incidents of targeted school shootings and school

attacks that occurred in the United States beginning with the earliest identified

incident in 1974 through May 2000. The focus of the

Safe School Initiative was on

examining the thinking, planning, and other behaviors engaged in by students who

carried out school attacks. Particular attention was given to identifying pre-attack

behaviors and communications that might be detectable--or "knowable"--and could

help in preventing some future attacks.

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

The Safe School Initiative was implemented through the Secret Service’s National

Threat Assessment Center and the Department of Education’s Safe and Drug-Free

Schools Program. The

Initiative drew from the Secret Service’s experience in

studying and preventing assassination and other types of targeted violence and the

Department of Education’s expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through

the creation of safe environments for students, faculty, and staff.

This document, the

Safe School Initiative’s final report, details how our two agencies

studied school-based attacks and what we found. Some of the findings may surprise

you. It is clear that there is no simple explanation as to why these attacks have

occurred. Nor is there a simple solution to stop this problem. But the findings of

the

Safe School Initiative do suggest that some future attacks may be preventable if

those responsible for safety in schools know what questions to ask and where to

uncover information that may help with efforts to intervene before a school attack

can occur.

Since it began in June 1999, our partnership has been a tremendous asset to each of

our respective agencies and vital to the success of this study. It is our hope that the

information we present in this final report is useful to those of you on the front lines

of this problem–the administrators, educators, law enforcement officials, and others

with protective responsibilities in schools–and to anyone concerned with children’s

safety. We encourage all of you in your efforts to keep our nation’s children safe in

school and hope this report helps you in those efforts.

Rod Paige W. Ralph Basham

Secretary Director

U.S. Department of Education U.S. Secret Service

CKNOWLEDGMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education are grateful to many

agencies and individuals for their assistance in planning and carrying out the

Safe

School Initiative.

First and foremost, the authors of this report owe a debt of

gratitude to the representatives of the numerous law enforcement and criminal

justice agencies that permitted Secret Service personnel to review investigative files

on the school attacks in their respective communities; provided other key

information and materials relating to these attacks; and assisted and supported

Secret Service personnel in seeking permission to interview 10 attackers. Moreover,

the authors are grateful to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice

Programs’ National Institute of Justice for providing critical financial support that

helped make the study possible.

In addition, Secret Service and Department of Education personnel benefited

substantially from the contributions of several law enforcement, behavioral science

and mental health professionals whose collective experience and expertise helped to

inform the development of the project plan and research design. In alphabetical

order, these individuals are: Gerardo Blue, Frederick Calhoun, Charles Ewing,

Michael Gelles, Dennis McCarthy, Edward Mulvey, William Pollack, Larry Porte,

Pam Robbins, Raymond Smyth, Sara Strizzi, and Andrew Vita.

This project would not have been possible without the support and guidance that the

authors received from several key officials and personnel at the Department of

Education and the Secret Service. Absent the expertise and insights of these

individuals, the Secret Service’s experience in researching and preventing targeted

violence could not have been translated into a useful study of targeted school

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

violence. At the Department of Education, these individuals are: Secretary of

Education Rod Paige, former Secretary of Education Richard Riley and Connie

Deshpande. Secret Service officials who provided guidance and support for this

project are: Director Brian Stafford, Assistant Director Terry Samway, Deputy

Assistant Directors Bob Byers and Tom Riopelle, Special Agent in Charge George

Luczko and Resident Agent in Charge John Berglund. Special thanks are extended

to Social Science Research Specialist Karissa Kumm who assisted with project data

collection and was instrumental in organizing information from the

Safe School

Initiative

kick-off meeting. Our thanks go also to Dean Terry, Michael Gelles and

Marty Allen for providing extensive assistance with project data collection.

The authors extend special thanks to Assistant Director Barbara Riggs, Office of

Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service, for her support of the

Safe School Initiative

and the National Threat Assessment Center.

The authors wish to thank Assistant Special Agent in Charge Matt Doherty, Assistant

to the Special Agent in Charge Cindy Rubendall and Special Agent Ignacio Zamora

for giving generously of their time in reviewing earlier drafts of this document, and

former Special Agent Nancy Fogarty, Social Science Research Specialists Derricka

Dean and Megan Williams and interns Marissa Savastana, Becca Norwick and

Colleen Spokis for their invaluable assistance with data collection, data entry and

project management.

Finally, the Secret Service and the Department of Education gratefully acknowledge

the contributions of Paul Kelly and Gwen Holden of the Nauset Group, whose

insightful observations and comments helped to shape the

Final Report. Special

thanks go out to Gwen Holden, who edited the

Final Report.

Bryan Vossekuil

Robert Fein

Marisa Reddy

Randy Borum

William Modzeleski

Washington, D.C.

May 2002

ABLE OF CONTENTS

vii

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION: THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE . . . . . . . . .1

The

Safe School Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Defining "Targeted" School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

The Secret Service Threat Assessment Approach . . . . . . . . . . . .4

The Prevalence of Violence in American Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

The Study Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Sources of Information on Incidents of

Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Coding of Primary Source Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Analysis of Responses to the Coded Study Questions . . . . . . . .10

Organization of the Final Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Overview of

Safe School Initiative Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

CHAPTER II: CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF

TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Target and Victim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

CHAPTER III: FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Characterizing the Attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Conceptualizing the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Signaling the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Advancing the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

Resolving the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

CHAPTER IV: IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

FINDINGS FOR THE PREVENTION OF

TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

The Implications of Key Study Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION: THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A

PROMISING STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING

SCHOOL VIOLENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Threat Assessment and Targeted School Violence Prevention . . .41

APPENDIX A: INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

BY STATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

APPENDIX B: INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

BY YEAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

APPENDIX C: RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

ONT

ACT INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

viii

HAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

HAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

Littleton, CO; Springfield, OR; West Paducah, KY; Jonesboro, AR. These

communities have become familiar to many Americans as among the locations of

those schools where shootings have occurred nationwide in recent years. In the

aftermath of these tragic events, educators, law enforcement officials, mental health

professionals and parents have pressed for answers to two central questions: "Could

we have known that these attacks were being planned?" and, if so, "What could we

have done to prevent these attacks from occurring?"

This publication,

The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative:

Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States, is a recent

product of an ongoing collaboration between the U. S. Secret Service and the U. S.

Department of Education to begin to answer these questions.

It is the culmination

of an extensive examination of 37 incidents of targeted school violence that occurred

in the United States from December 1974 through May 2000.

The

Safe School Initiative

Following the attack at Columbine High School in April 1999, the Secret Service and

the Department of Education initiated, in June 1999, a study of the thinking,

planning and other pre-attack behaviors engaged in by attackers who carried out

school shootings. That study, the

Safe School Initiative, was pursued under a

partnership between the Secret Service and the Department of Education, and

implemented through the Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center and

the Department of Education’s Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program. In its

execution, the

Safe School Initiative drew from the Secret Service’s experience in

studying and preventing targeted violence and from the Department of Education’s

expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the creation of safe

environments for students, faculty and staff.

The objective of the

Safe School Initiative was to attempt to identify information that

could be obtainable, or "knowable," prior to an attack. That information would then

be analyzed and evaluated to produce a factual, accurate knowledge base on targeted

school attacks. This knowledge could be used to help communities across the

country to formulate policies and strategies aimed at preventing school-based attacks.

Key features of the

Safe School Initiative were its focus on "targeted" school violence

and its adaptation of earlier Secret Service research on assassination for its

examination of incidents of school-based attacks.

This report is an update and expansion of the earlier

Interim Report on the Prevention of Targeted

Violence in Schools,

which was released in October 2000. This

Final Report

supercedes the

Interim Report

and should be used and referenced in place of the

Interim Report

See Section I, "INTRODUCTION: THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE, Methodology," for a discussion of the

approach used by the Secret Service to identify incidents of school-based attacks.

HAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

international leaders, all of whom are referred to as "protectees." The Secret Service

provides this protection by means of two distinct yet complementary strategies: the

use of physical measures--including magnetometers, armored vehicles, perimeters of

armed agents, and canine units--that are designed to both deter potential attacks and

serve as protective barriers in the event someone tries to attack; and a second, far

less visible component known as threat assessment.

Threat assessment is a process of identifying, assessing and, managing the threat that

certain persons may pose to Secret Service protectees. The goal of threat assessment

is to intervene before an attack can occur. The threat assessment process involves

three principal steps–all before the person has the opportunity to attack:

• identifying individuals who have the idea or intent of attacking a Secret

Service protectee;

• assessing whether the individual poses a risk to a protectee, after gathering

sufficient information from multiple sources; and,

• managing the threat the individual poses, in those cases where the individual

investigated is determined to pose a threat.

The Secret Service considers threat assessment to be as important to preventing

targeted violence as the physical measures it employs.

In 1998, the Secret Service established the National Threat Assessment Center, an

entity within the Secret Service that is dedicated to continuing efforts agency-wide to

better understand and prevent targeted violence, and to share this developing

knowledge with other constituencies responsible for public safety and violence

prevention. Adaptation of its threat assessment protocols for use in addressing the

problem of school-based attacks is the most recent of the Secret Service’s initiatives

to share this body of knowledge and expertise with other constituencies engaged in

developing strategies to address targeted violence issues. In the late 1990s, the

Secret Service and the Justice Department’s National Institute of Justice joined forces

to make information on the Secret Service’s threat assessment protocols available to

a wider law enforcement audience.

Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment

Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials,

released in

July 1998, offers state and local police officials insights into the elements of carrying

out and evaluating the findings of threat assessment investigations.

In addition, since the release of the Safe School Initiative Interim Report in October

2000, personnel from the Secret Service and the Department of Education have

given over 100 seminars and briefings on the study to thousands of educators, law

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

Defining "Targeted" School Violence

The Safe School Initiative examined incidents of "targeted violence" in school

settings–school shootings and other school-based attacks where the school was

deliberately selected as the location for the attack and was not simply a random site

of opportunity. The term "targeted violence" evolved from the Secret Service’s five-

year study of the behavior of individuals who have carried out, or attempted, lethal

attacks on public officials or prominent individuals. That study, the Secret Service’s

Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), was initiated in 1992 under funding provided

by the U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs’ National Institute of

Justice.

The focus of the ECSP study was an operational analysis of the thinking and behavior

of those who have assassinated, attacked or tried to attack a national public official

or public figure in the United States since 1949. The ECSP defined "targeted

violence" as any incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a

particular target prior to their violent attack.

The purpose of the ECSP was to

generate a better understanding of attacks against public officials that, in turn, would

help Secret Service agents in their investigations of threats toward the president and

others they protect and in the prevention of harm to these protected officials.

The ECSP sought to identify what information might be knowable prior to an attack

and to better enable intervention before an attack occurred. Findings from the ECSP

helped to dispel several myths and misconceptions about assassination.

In addition to the ECSP’s particular focus on incidents involving attacks on public

officials and prominent individuals, other types of violence in which a victim is

targeted specifically include assassinations, stalking, some forms of domestic

violence, some types of workplace violence, and some types of school violence. In

the case of targeted school violence, the target may be a specific individual, such as a

particular classmate or teacher, or a group or category of individuals, such as "jocks"

or "geeks." The target may even be the school itself.

The Secret Service Threat Assessment Approach

The findings of the ECSP also led to the Secret Service’s development of a more

thorough and focused process for conducting threat assessment investigations. As

par

t of its mission, t

he Secret Service is responsible for protecting the president and

vice president of the United States and their families and certain national and

Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G. (1995). Threat assessment: An approach to prevent targeted

violence.

National Institute of Justice: Research in Action,

1-7.

Fein, R., & V

ossekuil, B. (1999). Assassination in the United States: An operational study of r

ecent

assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers.

Journal of Forensic Sciences,

44, 321-333.

Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. (1998).

Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for

State and Local Law Enforcement Officials.

U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

National Institute of Justice: W

ashington, D.C.

HAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

The findings of the Safe School Initiative’s extensive search for recorded incidents of

targeted school-based attacks underscore the rarity of lethal attacks in school

settings. The Department of Education reports that nearly 60 million children

attend the nation’s 119,000+ schools.

The combined efforts of the Secret Service

and the Department of Education identified 37 incidents of targeted school-based

attacks, committed by 41 individuals over a 25-year period.

Nevertheless, the impact of targeted school-based attacks cannot be measured in

statistics alone. While it is clear that other kinds of problems in American schools are

far more common than the targeted violence that has taken place in them, the high-

profile shootings that have occurred in schools over the past decade have resulted in

increased fear among students, parents, and educators. School shootings are a rare,

but significant, component of the problem of school violence. Each school-based

attack has had a tremendous and lasting effect on the school in which it occurred,

the surrounding community, and the nation as a whole. In the wake of these attacks,

fear of future targeted school violence has become a driving force behind the efforts

of school officials, law enforcement professionals, and parents to identify steps that

can be taken to prevent incidents of violence in their schools.

Methodology

The Secret Service and the Department of Education began work on the Safe School

Initiative study in June 1999. Research protocols employed in carrying out and

analyzing the findings of this work reflect an adaptation of the ECSP operational

approach to examining targeted attacks against public officials and prominent

individuals. Researchers used a similar operational focus for the

Safe School

Initiative to develop information that could be useful to schools in better

understanding and preventing targeted violence in school settings. The emphasis of

the study was on examining the attackers’ pre-incident thinking and behavior, to

explore information that could aid in preventing future attacks.

For the purposes of this study, an incident of targeted school violence was defined as

any incident where (i) a current student or recent former student attacked someone

at his or her school with lethal means (e.g., a gun or knife); and, (ii) where the

student attacker purposefully chose his or her school as the location of the attack.

Consistent with this definition, incidents where the school was chosen simply as a

site of opportunity, such as incidents that were solely related to gang or drug trade

activity or to a violent interaction between individuals that just happened to occur at

the school, were not included.

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

enforcement officials, mental health professionals and others across the United

States. Several questions and discussion points raised by seminar attendees have

been addressed in this final report.

Finally, the Department of Education and the Secret Service currently are completing

work on a guide to investigating and responding to threats in schools. The guide is

scheduled for publication in 2002. The guide will include recommendations for

investigating and evaluating threats and other behaviors of concern in school;

address considerations for developing policies and capacity to support threat

assessment efforts in schools; and provide suggestions for approaches schools can

adopt to foster school environments that reduce threats of targeted violence.

The Prevalence of Violence in American Schools

Public policy-makers, school administrators, police officials, and parents continue to

search for explanations for the targeted violence that occurred at Columbine High

School and other schools across the country, and seek assurance that similar

incidents will not be repeated at educational institutions in their communities. While

the quest for solutions to the problem of targeted school violence is of critical

importance, reports from the Department of Education, the Justice Department, and

other sources indicate that few children are likely to fall prey to life-threatening

violence in school settings.

To put the problem of targeted school-based attacks in context, from 1993 to 1997,

the odds that a child in grades 9-12 would be threatened or injured with a weapon in

school were 7 to 8 percent, or 1 in 13 or 14; the odds of getting into a physical fight

at school were 15 percent, or 1 in 7.

In contrast, the odds that a child would die in

school–by homicide or suicide–are, fortunately, no greater than 1 in 1 million.

1998, students in grades 9-12 were the victims of 1.6 million thefts and 1.2 million

nonfatal violent crimes, while in this same period 60 school-associated violent deaths

were reported for this student population.

U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics (2002).

Digest of Education

Statistics 2000

; Washington D.C.: Authors

Supra

note 2.

See, for example, Kaufman, P., et. al. (2000).

Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2000

. U. S.

Department of Education (NCES 2001-017) and U. S. Department of Justice (NCJ-184176): Washington,

D. C. Online Vers.: http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubinfo.asp?pubid=2001017; Anderson, M., et. al.

(2001). School-associated Violent Deaths in the United States, 1994-1999.

Journal of the American

Medical Association, 286

, 2695-2702; and, National Resear

ch Council and Institute of Medicine, Committee

on Law and Justice and Board on Children, Youth, and Families. (2001).

Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice

Panel on Juvenile Crime: Prevention, Treatment, and Control. McCord, J., et. al. (Eds.). National Academy

Press: Washington, D.C.

Snyder, H.N., & Sickmund, M. (1999).

Juvenile offenders and victims: 1999 National Report.

Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.

vailable online at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/index.html.

U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice (1999).

1999 Annual Report on School

Safety.

Washington, D.C.: Authors.

Ibid.

HAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

source materials concerning the incident. These primary source materials included

investigative, school, court, and mental health records.

In addition, study researchers conducted supplemental interviews with 10 of the

perpetrators of incidents of the school-based attacks identified by the Secret Service

and the Department of Education. These interviews provided researchers with

further opportunity to examine the incident from the point of view of the attacker

and to "walk through the process of the attack" from its conceptualization to its

execution. Insights gleaned from these interviews have been used by the Secret

Service primarily in training venues to illustrate particular aspects of incidents of

targeted school violence.

Coding of Primary Source Materials

Each member of the review team assigned to a particular incident independently

answered several hundred questions about each case, entering his or her answers to

the questions in a codebook. Review team members were instructed to record

information gathered from primary sources as it appeared in those sources, and not

to engage in interpretation of facts presented.

Information gathered and reflected in incident reviewers’ responses to the coded

study questions included facts about:

• the attacker’s development of an idea to harm the target, and progression

from the original idea to the attack;

• the attacker’s selection of the target(s);

• the attacker’s motive(s) for the incident;

• any communications made by the attacker about his or her ideas and intent,

including any threats made to the target(s) or about the target(s);

• evidence that the attacker planned the incident;

• the attacker’s mental health and substance abuse history, if any; and,

• the attacker’s life circumstances/situation at the time of the attack, including

relationships with parents and other family members; performance in school;

and treatment by fellow students.

Information regarding the attacker’s demographic characteristics and personal

history, including criminal and school history, also were coded. When each reviewer

had completed his or her response to the questions, the review team met as a whole

to compare responses and produce a single "reconciled" coding of the incident.

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

Under the study’s research strategy, each incident of targeted violence was assigned

to a study review team comprised of criminal investigators and social science

researchers. At least two reviewers were assigned to each incident.

The Secret Service and the Department of Education made every effort to ensure

that the

Safe School Initiative would produce information that would be useful for

school administrators, educators, law enforcement officials, and others working with

schools. To that end, researchers consulted regularly with experts in the fields of

education, school violence, and juvenile homicide, among others, in the course of

developing the study design and protocols. Feedback from these various experts was

incorporated into the final study design.

The Study Population

Researchers from the Secret Service and the Department of Education initiated their

study of targeted school violence with an extensive search for information that would

identify incidents of targeted school violence that have occurred in the United States.

Beginning with June 2000 and working back in time, researchers explored all

relevant, searchable databases maintained in the public domain or available by

subscription, such as public news databases and professional publications, to identify

incidents meeting the definition of the study population. Researchers also consulted

with law enforcement officials and school violence experts to develop leads on

incidents of school violence that might meet the criteria for inclusion in the study

constituency.

In the end, researchers identified 37 incidents of targeted school violence involving

41 attackers that occurred in the United States from 1974, the year in which the

earliest incident identified took place, through June 2000, when data collection for

the study was completed.

The school-based attacks included in the Safe School

Initiative

represent all of the incidents of targeted school violence meeting the study

criteria that Secret Service and Department of Education researchers were able to

identify in that time frame.

Sources of Information on Incidents of Targeted School Violence

Information on each incident of targeted school violence identified by Secret Service

and Department of Education researchers was drawn principally from primary

It is possible that incidents of targeted school violence other than those identified by

Safe School Initiative

esear

chers might have occurr

ed prior to the 1974 incident included in the study

, or between 1974 and

the completion of data collection for the study in June 2000. For example, incidents that met the study

definition, but that were not identifiable under the study search strategy, or that were not reported as

school-based crimes, would have been unlikely to come to the attention of Secr

et Ser

vice and Department

of Education researchers. In addition, incidents of targeted school violence that have occurred since June

2000 were outside the scope of the study.

HAPTER I- INTRODUCTION

the development of strategies to prevent targeted school violence. These findings

specifically concern what information was known–or “knowable”–about these

incidents prior to the attack, and that, in turn, might be relevant to efforts to prevent

future attacks. Discussion of these key findings also includes consideration of how

this information might be applicable to investigating threats and other behavior in

schools that may raise concerns.

In the final chapter of this report, Chapter V: "Threat Assessment as a Promising

Strategy for Preventing School Violence," the authors offer some concluding

observations on how threat assessment protocols might be incorporated into

strategies to prevent targeted violence in schools.

Overview of

Safe School Initiative

Findings

The findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that there are productive actions

that educators, law enforcement officials, and others can pursue in response to the

problem of targeted school violence. Specifically,

Initiative findings suggest that

these officials may wish to consider focusing their efforts to formulate strategies for

preventing these attacks in two principal areas:

• developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable

information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack;

and,

• employing the results of these risk evaluations or "threat assessments" in

developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.

Support for these suggestions is found in 10 key findings of the

Safe School Initiative

study. These findings are as follows:

• Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely were sudden, impulsive acts.

• Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or

plan to attack.

• Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the

attack.

• There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engaged in targeted

school violence.

• Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused

thers concern or indicated a need for help.

• Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal

ailur

es. Mor

er, many had considered or attempted suicide.

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

Analysis of Responses to the Coded Study Questions

Findings presented in Chapter III of this report reflect researchers’ careful analysis of

the coded responses to the extensive questionnaire employed in recording

information gathered on each of the 37 school-based attacks and 41 attackers that

were examined in the

Safe School Initiative. Researchers were cautious not to

overreach in drawing conclusions from this information.

Primary source materials reviewed for the 37 incidents did not provide answers in

every case to all of the areas of inquiry covered in the questionnaire. In general,

researchers declined to draw a conclusion if information directly responsive to a

particular area of inquiry was available for fewer than half of the incidents reviewed.

Moreover, even when answers to a particular coded study question were available for

the majority of incidents, these responses collectively did not suggest in all cases a

common or shared characteristic. Here again, researchers were cautious not to draw

a conclusion in a particular area of inquiry if that conclusion was supported by fewer

than the majority of the responses to the subject question.

However, in some cases, researchers believed that the absence of a common or

shared characteristic or behavior in the coded responses to inquiries–most notably

with respect to the characteristics and behaviors of the attackers--was sufficiently

compelling to note those observations as findings as well.

Organization of the Final Report

The remainder of this report is organized into four chapters. Chapter II:

"Characteristics of Incidents of Targeted School Violence," presents basic descriptive

information about the attacks examined by the

Safe School Initiative, including

incident, target, and victim characteristics. Chapter III: "Findings of the Safe School

Initiative," describes the conclusions reached by Safe School Initiative researchers

after careful analysis of the facts and other information collected in the course of the

Secret Service’s and the Department of Education’s study of targeted school

violence.

Chapter IV: "Implications of

Safe School Initiative Findings for the Prevention of

Targeted School Violence," will be of particular interest to educators, law

enforcement officials, and others who are seeking guidance to inform efforts to

address the problem of targeted school violence. In this chapter, the authors focus in

on 1

0 key findings of the

Saf

e School Initiative

hat appear to have implications for

Her

e the term "pr

ofile" r

efers to a set of demographic and other traits that a set of perpetrators of a crime

have in common. Please refer to "Characterizing the Attacker" in Chapter III and to Reddy et al. (2001),

"Evaluating risk for tar

geted violence in schools" in the Resour

ces section for further explanation of the term

"profile."

• Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the

attack.

• Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

• In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.

• Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were

stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

HAPTER II- CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF

INCIDENTS OF TARGETED

SCHOOL VIOLENCE

HAPTER II- CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE

The Safe School Initiative found that targeted school violence is not a new or recent

phenomenon. The earliest case that researchers were able to identify occurred in

1974. In that incident, a student brought guns and homemade bombs to his school;

set off the fire alarm; and shot at emergency and custodial personnel who responded

to the alarm.

The

Safe School Initiative identified 37 incidents involving 41 attackers that met the

study definition of targeted school violence and occurred between 1974 and the end

of the 2000 school year.

These incidents took place in 26 states, with more than

one incident occurring in Arkansas, California, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, and

Tennessee.

Analysis of the study findings identified the following characteristics of incidents of

targeted school violence:

• In almost three-quarters of the incidents, the attacker killed one or more

students, faculty, or others at the school (73 percent, n=27

). In the

remaining incidents, the attackers used a weapon to injure at least one person

at school (24 percent, n=9). In one incident, a student killed his family and

then held his class hostage with a weapon.

• More than one-half of the attacks occurred during the school day (59 percent,

n=22), with fewer occurring before school (22 percent, n=8) or after school

(16 percent, n=6).

• Almost all of the attackers were current students at the school where they

carried out their attacks (95 percent, n=39). Only two attackers were former

students of the school where they carried out their attacks at the time of

those attacks (5 percent, n=2).

• All of the incidents of targeted school violence examined in the

Safe School

Initiative were committed by boys or young men (100 percent, n=41).

• In most of the incidents, the attackers carried out the attack alone (81

percent, n=30). In four of the incidents, the attacker engaged in the attack on

his own but had assistance in planning the attack (11 percent, n=4). In three

incidents, two or more attackers carried out the attack together (8 percent, n=3).

See Appendix B for a list of the dates of the incidents of targeted school violence examined by the Safe

School Initiative.

See Appendix A for a list of the locations of the incidents of targeted school violence studied under the

Safe School Initiative.

"N" refers to the number of attackers that corresponds to the reported percentage. Unless indicated

otherwise, when the finding pertains to total attackers all N’s are out of a total of 41. When the finding

pertains to total incidents (i.e., school-based attacks) all N’s are out of a total of 37 incidents.

While all the attackers in this study were boys, it would be misleading to read the findings of this study as

suggesting that a girl could not or would not carr

y out a school-based attack. For example, an incident

occurred after the completion of this study in which a girl shot her classmate at a parochial school in

Williamsport, Pa. In addition, a well-publicized school shooting that occurred in San Diego, Calif., in 1976

was carried out by a woman. The San Diego incident was not included in this study because the attacker

was not a curr

ent or former student of the school where she conducted her attack, but, rather, lived across

the street from the school.

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

• Most attackers used some type of gun as their primary weapon, with over half

of the attackers using handguns (61 percent, n=25), and nearly half of them

using rifles or shotguns (49 percent, n=20).

Three-quarters of the attackers

used only one weapon (76 percent, n=31) to harm their victims, although

almost half of the attackers had more than one weapon with them at time of

the attack (46 percent, n=19).

Target and Victim Characteristics

Perpetrators of incidents of targeted school violence chose a range of targets for their

attacks, including fellow students, faculty and staff, and the school itself. These

incidents were usually planned in advance and for most part included intent to harm

a specific, pre-selected target, whether or not the attacker’s execution of the incident,

in fact, resulted in harm to the target.

Target and victim characteristics identified by the

Safe School Initiative were:

• In over half of the incidents (54 percent, n=22), the attacker had selected at

least one school administrator, faculty member, or staff member as a target.

Students were chosen as targets in fewer than half of the incidents (41

percent, n=15).

• In nearly half of the incidents, the attackers were known to have chosen more

than one target prior to their attack (44 percent, n=16).

• Most attackers had a grievance against at least one of their targets prior to the

attack (73 percent, n=30).

• In almost half of the incidents (46 percent, n=17), individuals who were

targeted prior to the attack also became victims (i.e., individuals actually

harmed in the attack). However, other individuals at the school, who were

not identified as original targets of the attack, were injured or killed as well.

Among these non-targeted individuals, over half were other students (57

percent, n=21) and over one-third (39 percent, n=16) were school

administrators, faculty, or staff.

These per

centages include all weapons used (i.e., dischar

ged) in the attack, and ther

efore total more

than 100 percent.

For the purposes of this study, "grievance" was defined as "a belief that some other person or

organization is directly or indirectly responsible for injury or harm to self and/or someone whom the

subject car

es about."

HAPTER III- FINDINGS OF THE

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS OF THE

SAFE

SCHOOL INITIATIVE

HAPTER III- FINDINGS OF THE

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

The findings of researchers’ analysis of the 37 incidents of targeted school violence

that were examined under the

Safe School Initiative fall generally into five areas:

• characterizing the attacker;

• conceptualizing the attack;

• signaling the attack;

• advancing the attack; and,

• resolving the attack.

The findings in each of these areas are presented and explained below.

Characterizing the Attacker

Finding

There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engaged in targeted school

violence.

Explanation

Although all of the attackers in this study were boys, there is no set of traits that

described all–or even most–of the attackers. Instead, they varied considerably in

demographic, background, and other characteristics.

• The attackers ranged in age from 11 to 21, with most attackers between the

ages of 13 and 18 at the time of the attack (85 percent, n=35).

• Three-quarters of the attackers were white (76 percent, n=31). One-quarter

of the attackers came from other racial and ethnic backgrounds, including

African American (12 percent, n=5), Hispanic (5 percent, n=2), Native

Alaskan (2 percent, n=1), Native American (2 percent, n=1), and Asian (2

percent, n=1).

The attackers came from a variety of family situations, ranging from intact families

with numerous ties to the community, to foster homes with histories of neglect.

• Almost two-thirds of the attackers came from two-parent families (63 percent,

n=26), living either with both biological parents (44 percent, n=18) or with

one biological parent and one stepparent (19 percent, n=8).

• Some lived with one biological parent (19 percent, n=8) or split time between

two biological parents (2 percent, n=1).

• Very few lived with a foster parent or legal guardian (5 percent, n=2).

Supra

note 13.

HAPTER III- FINDINGS OF THE

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

• A few attackers even showed some improvements in academic performance (5

percent, n=2) or

declines in disciplinary problems at school (7 percent, n=3)

prior to the attack. In one case, the dean of students had commended a

student a few weeks before he attacked his school for improvements in his

grades and a decline in the number of disciplinary problems involving that

student in school.

Finding

Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.

Explanation

Almost three-quarters of the attackers felt persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked,

or injured by others prior to the incident (71percent, n=29).

In several cases, individual attackers had experienced bullying and harassment that

was long-standing and severe. In some of these cases the experience of being bullied

seemed to have a significant impact on the attacker and appeared to have been a

factor in his decision to mount an attack at the school.

In one case, most of the

attacker’s schoolmates described the attacker as "the kid everyone teased." In

witness statements from that incident, schoolmates alleged that nearly every child in

the school had at some point thrown the attacker against a locker, tripped him in the

hall, held his head under water in the pool, or thrown things at him. Several

schoolmates had noted that the attacker seemed more annoyed by, and less tolerant

of, the teasing than usual in the days preceding the attack.

Finding

A history of having been the subject of a mental health evaluation, diagnosed with a

mental disorder, or involved in substance abuse did not appear to be prevalent

among attackers. However, most attackers showed some history of suicidal attempts

or thoughts, or a history of feeling extreme depression or desperation.

Explanation

• Only one-third of attackers had ever received a mental health evaluation (34

per

cent, n=1

4), and f

ewer than one-fifth had been diagnosed with mental

health or behavior disorder prior to the attack (17 percent, n=7).

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

For those incidents for which information on the attackers’ school performance was

available, that information indicates that those attackers differed considerably from

one another in their academic achievement in school, with grades ranging from

excellent to failing (n=34).

• The attackers in the largest grouping were doing well in school at the time of

the attack, generally receiving As and Bs in their courses (41 percent; n=17);

some were even taking Advanced Placement courses at the time of the

incident or had been on the honor roll repeatedly.

• Fewer of the attackers were receiving Bs and Cs (15 percent, n=6), or Cs and

Ds (22 percent, n=9).

• Very few of the attackers were known to be failing in school (5 percent, n=2).

Attackers also varied in the types of social relationships they had established, ranging

from socially isolated to popular among their peers.

• The largest group of attackers for whom this information was available

appeared to socialize with mainstream students or were considered

mainstream students themselves (41 percent, n=17).

• One-quarter of the attackers (27 percent, n=11) socialized with fellow

students who were disliked by most mainstream students or were considered

to be part of a "fringe" group.

• Few attackers had no close friends (12 percent, n=5).

• One-third of attackers had been characterized by others as "loners," or felt

themselves to be loners (34 percent, n=14).

• However, nearly half of the attackers were involved in some organized social

activities in or outside of school (44 percent, n=18). These activities included

sports teams, school clubs, extracurricular activities, and mainstream religious

groups.

Attackers’ histories of disciplinary problems at school also varied. Some attackers

had no observed behavioral problems, while others had multiple behaviors

warranting reprimand and/or discipline.

• Nearly two-thirds of the attackers had never been in trouble or rarely were in

trouble at school (63 percent, n=26).

• One-quarter of the attackers had ever been suspended from school (27

percent, n=11).

• Only a few attackers had ever been expelled from school (10 percent, n=4).

Most attackers showed

no marked change in academic performance (56 percent,

n=23), friendship patterns (73 percent, n=30), interest in school (59 percent, n=24),

or school disciplinary problems (68 percent, n=28) prior to their attack.

It is important to note that the way in which information was gather

ed for the

Safe School Initiative

did

not permit researchers to determine the exact proportion of attackers who had been victims of bullying

specifically

. Moreover, not every attacker in this study felt bullied.

The

Safe School Initiative

’s approach to gathering information concerning incidents of targeted school

violence did not permit researchers to determine conclusively whether the experience of being bullied--or

per

ceptions that they had been bullied--

caused

the attacker to engage in tar

geted school violence.

HAPTER III- FINDINGS OF THE

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

Finding

Most attackers were known to have had difficulty coping with significant losses or

personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.

Explanation

Most attackers appeared to have difficulty coping with losses, personal failures, or

other difficult circumstances. Almost all of the attackers had experienced or

perceived some major loss prior to the attack (98 percent, n=40). These losses

included a perceived failure or loss of status (66 percent, n=27); loss of a loved one

or of a significant relationship, including a romantic relationship (51 percent, n=21);

and a major illness experienced by the attacker or someone significant to him (15

percent, n=6). In one case, the attacker, who was a former student at the school

where the attack occurred, was laid off from his job because he did not have a high

school diploma. The attacker blamed the job loss on the teacher who failed him in a

senior-year course, which kept him from graduating. He returned to the school a

year after leaving the school, killed his former teacher and two students, and then

held over 60 students hostage for 10 hours.

For most attackers, their outward behaviors suggested difficulty in coping with loss

(83 percent, n=34). For example, the mother, the brother, and a friend of the

attacker who lost his job each had commented that the attacker became depressed

and withdrawn following the lay-off. The friend also reported that he knew that the

attacker blamed his former teacher for his problems and had begun planning how to

retaliate.

Conceptualizing the Attack

Finding

Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.

Explanation

Several findings of the Safe School Initiative indicate clearly that the school-based

attacks studied were rarely impulsive. Rather, these attacks typically were thought

out beforehand and involved some degree of advance planning. In many cases, the

attacker’s observable behavior prior to the attack suggested he might be planning or

preparing for a school attack.

In nearly all of the incidents for which information concerning the attacker’s

concep

tualization of t

he attack was available, researchers found that the attacker had

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

• Although most attackers had not received a formal mental health evaluation

or diagnosis, most attackers exhibited a history of suicide attempts or suicidal

thoughts at some point prior to their attack (78 percent, n=32). More than

half of the attackers had a documented history of feeling extremely depressed

or desperate (61 percent, n=25).

• Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had a known history of alcohol or

substance abuse (24 percent, n=10).

• The only information collected that would indicate whether attackers had

been prescribed psychiatric medications concerned medication non-

compliance (i.e., failure to take medication as prescribed). Ten percent of the

attackers (n=4) were known to be non-compliant with prescribed psychiatric

medications.

Finding

Over half of the attackers demonstrated some interest in violence, through movies,

video games, books, and other media (59 percent, n=24). However, there was no

one common type of interest in violence indicated. Instead, the attackers’ interest in

violent themes took various forms.

Explanation

• Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had exhibited an interest in violent

movies (27 percent, n=11).

• Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had exhibited an interest in violent

books (24 percent, n=10).

• One-eighth of the attackers exhibited an interest in violent video games (12

percent, n=5).

• The largest group of attackers exhibited an interest in violence in their own

writings, such as poems, essays, or journal entries (37 percent, n=15).

Finding

Most attackers had no history of prior violent or criminal behavior.

Explanation

• Fewer than one-third of the attackers were known to have acted violently

toward others at some point prior to the incident (31 percent, n=13).

• Very few of the attackers were known to have harmed or killed an animal at

any time prior to the incident (12 percent, n=5).

• Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had a prior history of arrest (27

percent, n=11).

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

developed his idea to harm the target(s) before the attack (95 percent, n=39). The

length of time that attackers held this idea prior to the actual attack varied

considerably. Some attackers conceived of the attack as few as one or two days prior

to advancing that attack; other attackers had held the idea of the attack for as long as

a year prior to carrying it out. For those incidents where information was available

to determine how long the attacker had an idea to harm the target (n=33), the

analysis showed that a little over half of the attackers developed their idea for the

incident at least a month prior to the attack (51 percent, n=17).

In addition, almost all of the attackers

planned out the attack in advance of carrying

it out (93 percent; n=38). Moreover, there was evidence from the attacker’s behavior

prior to the attack that the attacker had a plan or was preparing to harm the target(s)

(93 percent, n=38). For example, one attacker asked his friends to help him get

ammunition for one of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make it easier to

conceal beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat with his mother; and cut

the pockets out of the coat so that he could conceal the weapon within the coat while

holding the weapon through one of the cut-out pockets. That attacker had a well-

known fascination with weapons and had told his friends on several occasions that

he thought about killing certain students at school.

The length of time between the planning and execution of the attacks also varied

considerably for the targeted school violence incidents studied. Some attackers

developed their plans on the day of their attack or only one or two days prior; others

developed their plans between six and eight months prior to the attack. In cases

where there was information available to establish the date planning began (n=29),

analysis of available information revealed that most of the attackers developed a plan

at least two days prior to the attack (69 percent, n=21).

Revenge was a motive for more than half of the attackers (61 percent, n=25). Other

motives included trying to solve a problem (34 percent, n=14); suicide or desperation

(27 percent, n=11); and efforts to get attention or recognition (24 percent, n=10).

More than half of the attackers had

multiple motives or reasons for their school-

based attacks (54 percent, n=22). In addition, most of the attackers held some sort

of grievance at the time of the attack, either against their target(s) or against

someone else (81 percent, n=33). Many attackers told other people about these

grievances prior to their attacks (66 percent, n=27).

HAPTER III- FINDINGS OF THE

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

Signaling the Attack

Finding

Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to

attack.

Explanation

In most cases, other people knew about the attack before it took place. In over

three-quarters of the incidents, at least one person had information that the attacker

was thinking about or planning the school attack (81 percent, n=30). In nearly two-

thirds of the incidents, more than one person had information about the attack

before it occurred (59 percent, n=22). In nearly all of these cases, the person who

knew was a peer–a friend, schoolmate, or sibling (93 percent, n=28/30). Some

peers knew exactly what the attacker planned to do; others knew something "big" or

"bad" was going to happen, and in several cases knew the time and date it was to

occur. An adult had information about the idea or plan in only two cases.

In one incident, for example, the attacker had planned to shoot students in the lobby

of his school prior to the beginning of the school day. He told two friends exactly

what he had planned and asked three others to meet him that morning in the

mezzanine overlooking the lobby, ostensibly so that these students would be out of

harm’s way. On most mornings, usually only a few students would congregate on the

mezzanine before the school day began. However, by the time the attacker arrived at

school on the morning of the attack, word about what was going to happen had

spread to such an extent that 24 students were on the mezzanine waiting for the

attack to begin. One student who knew the attack was to occur brought a camera so

that he could take pictures of the event.

Finding

Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.

Explanation

The ma

jority of the attackers in the targeted school violence incidents examined

under the

Safe Sc

hool Initiativ

did not t

eat

en t

heir target(s) directly, i.e., did not

ell the target they intended to harm them, whether in direct, indirect, or conditional

language prior to the attack. Only one-sixth of the attackers threatened their

t(s) dir

ectly prior to the attack (17 percent, n=7).

Supra

note 19.

HAPTER III- FINDINGS OF THE

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

him with it. He wanted to look tough so that the students who had been harassing

him would leave him alone. When he shared this idea with two friends, however,

they convinced him that exhibiting the gun would not be sufficient and that he would

have to

shoot at people at the school in order to get the other students to leave him

alone. It was after this conversation that this student decided to mount his school

attack.

In other cases, friends assisted the attacker in his efforts to acquire a weapon or

ammunition, discussed tactics for getting a weapon into school undetected, or helped

gather information about the whereabouts of a target at a particular time during the

school day.

Finding

Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

Explanation

Experience using weapons and access to them was common for many attackers.

Nearly two-thirds of the attackers had a known history of weapons use, including

knives, guns, and bombs (63 percent, n=26). Over half of the attackers had some

experience specifically with a gun prior to the incident (59 percent, n=24), while

others had experience with bombs or explosives (15 percent, n=6). However, fewer

than half of the attackers demonstrated any fascination or excessive interest with

weapons (44 percent, n=18), and fewer than one-third showed a fascination with

explosives (32 percent, n=13) prior to their attacks. Over two-thirds of the attackers

acquired the gun (or guns) used in their attacks from their own home or that of a

relative (68 percent, n=28).

Resolving the Attack

Finding

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means

other than law enforcement intervention.

Explanation

Most school-based attacks were stopped through intervention by school

administrators, educators, and students or by the attacker stopping on his own. In

about one-third of the incidents, the attacker was apprehended by or surrendered to

administrators, faculty, or school staff (27 percent, n=10) or to students (5 percent,

n=2). In jus

t o

ver one-fifth of the incidents, the attacker stopped on his own or left

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

Finding

Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others

concern or indicated a need for help.

Explanation

Almost all of the attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the attack that caused

others–school officials, parents, teachers, police, fellow students–to be concerned

(93 percent, n=38). In most of the cases, at least one

adult was concerned by the

attacker’s behavior (88 percent, n=36). In three-quarters of the cases, at least three

people–adults and other children–were concerned by the attacker’s behavior (76

percent, n=31). In one case, for example, the attacker made comments to at least 24

friends and classmates about his interest in killing other kids, building bombs, or

carrying out an attack at the school. A school counselor was so concerned about this

student’s behavior that the counselor asked to contact the attacker’s parents. The

attacker’s parents also knew of his interest in guns.

The behaviors that led other individuals to be concerned about the attacker included

both behaviors specifically related to the attack, such as efforts to get a gun, as well

as other disturbing behaviors not related to the subsequent attack. In one case, the

student’s English teacher became concerned about several poems and essays that the

student submitted for class assignments because they treated the themes of homicide

and suicide as possible solutions to his feelings of despair. In another case, the

student worried his friends by talking frequently about plans to put rat poison in the

cheese shakers at a popular pizza establishment. A friend of that student became so

concerned that the student was going to carry out the rat poison plan, that the friend

got out of bed late one night and left his house in search of his mother, who was not

home at the time, to ask her what to do.

Advancing the Attack

Finding

In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.

Explanation

Although most attackers carried out their attacks on their own, many attackers were

influenced or encouraged by others to engage in the attacks. Nearly half of the

attackers were influenced by other individuals in deciding to mount an attack, dared

or encouraged by others to attack, or both (44 percent; n=18). For example, one

att

ack

er’s original idea had been to bring a gun to school and let other students see

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

the school (22 percent, n=8). In a few incidents, the attacker killed himself during

the course of the incident (13 percent, n=5).

Just over one-quarter of the incidents were stopped through law enforcement

intervention (27 percent, n=10). Law enforcement personnel discharged weapons in

only three of the incidents of targeted school violence studied (8 percent, n=3).

Close to half of the incidents were known to last 15 minutes or less from the

beginning of the shooting to the time the attacker was apprehended, surrendered or

stopped shooting (47 percent, n=16).

One-quarter of the incidents were over within

five minutes of their inception (27 percent, n=9). The fact that it was not through

law enforcement intervention that most of the targeted school violence incidents

studied were stopped appears in large part to be a function of how brief most of

these incidents were in duration.

Information on incident duration was not available for seven of the incidents (19 percent).

HAPTER IV- IMPLICATIONS OF INITIATIVE FINDINGS

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS OF

SAFE

SCHOOL INITIATIVE

FINDINGS

FOR THE PREVENTION OF

TARGETED SCHOOL

VIOLENCE

HAPTER IV- IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE FINDINGS

After careful review of the case histories of the 37 incidents of targeted school

violence examined under the

Safe School Initiative, 10 key findings were identified

that highlight information that may have been known or knowable prior to school-

based attacks and that therefore might inform some type of intervention in or

prevention of future attacks. In this chapter, the authors discuss the implications

that these findings may have for schools and communities in developing strategies for

preventing targeted violence in schools.

In focusing in on these findings for their potential relevance to the development of

prevention and intervention strategies, the authors acknowledge that these findings

may raise other issues for consideration in addressing the problem of targeted school

violence beyond those noted here. Moreover, the authors recognize that the

conditions, circumstances and facts underlying the findings highlighted here may not

manifest themselves in the same way in every school. Schools and communities

therefore are in the best position to determine whether and how these findings and

the implications suggested may apply to their particular problems and needs.

The 10 key findings that the authors believe may have implications for the

development of strategies to address the problem of targeted school violence are as

follows:

• Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.

• Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or

plan to attack.

• Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the

attack.

• There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in targeted

school violence.

• Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused

others concern or indicated a need for help.

• Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal

failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.

• Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the

attack.

• Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

• In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.

• Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were

stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

HAPTER IV- IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE FINDINGS

school environment that inadvertently may discourage students from coming forward

with this information. Schools also may benefit from ensuring that they have a fair,

thoughtful, and effective system to respond to whatever information students do

bring forward. If students have concerns about how adults will react to information

that they bring forward, they may be even less inclined to volunteer such information.

In addition, this finding highlights the importance in an inquiry of attempts to gather

all relevant information from anyone who may have contact with the student. Efforts

to gather all potentially relevant pieces of information, however innocuous they may

appear on their own, from all individuals with whom the student has contact may

help to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student’s ideas, activities, and

plans. In the end, investigators may find that different people in the student’s life

have different pieces of the puzzle.

Key Finding 3

Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.

Implications

This finding underscores the importance of not waiting for a threat before beginning

an inquiry. The Safe School Initiative found that most attackers in fact did not

threaten their target directly and some made no threat at all. Instead, other

behaviors and communications that may prompt concern, such as hearing that a

child is talking about bringing a gun to school, are indicators that the child may pose

a threat and therefore should prompt the initiation of efforts to gather information.

School administrators should respond to all students who make threats. The lack of

response could be taken by the threatener as permission to proceed with carrying

out the threat. In the end, however, it is important to distinguish between someone

who

makes a threat–tells people they intend to harm someone–and someone who

poses a threat–engages in behaviors that indicate an intent, planning, or preparation

for an attack. Those conducting inquiries should focus particular attention on any

information that indicates that a student

poses a threat, regardless of whether the

student has told a potential target he or she intends to do them harm.

Key Finding 4

There is no accurat

e or useful profile of students who engaged in targeted school

violence.

plications

The demographic, personality, school history, and social characteristics of the

attackers varied substantially. Knowing that a particular student shares

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The Implications of Key Study Findings

Key Finding 1

Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.

Implications

Students who engaged in school-based attacks typically did not "just snap" and then

engage in impulsive or random acts of targeted school violence. Instead, the attacks

examined under the Safe School Initiative appeared to be the end result of a

comprehensible process of thinking and behavior: behavior that typically began with

an idea, progressed to the development of a plan, moved on to securing the means to

carry out the plan, and culminated in an attack. This is a process that potentially may

be knowable or discernible from the attacker’s behaviors and communications.

To the extent that information about an attacker’s intent and planning is knowable

and may be uncovered before an incident, some attacks may be preventable.

However, findings from the

Safe School Initiative suggest that the time span between

the attacker’s decision to mount an attack and the actual incident may be short.

Consequently, when indications that a student may pose a threat to the school

community arise in the form of revelations about a planned attack, school

administrators and law enforcement officials will need to move quickly to inquire

about and intervene in that plan.

Key Finding 2

Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to

attack. In most cases, those who knew were other kids–friends, schoolmates,

siblings, and others. However, this information rarely made its way to an adult.

Implications

First and foremost, this finding suggests that students can be an important part of

prevention efforts. A friend or schoolmate may be the first person to hear that a

student is thinking about or planning to harm someone. Nevertheless, for a variety

of reasons, those who have information about a potential incident of targeted school

violence may not alert an adult on their own. Schools can encourage students to

report this information in part by identifying and breaking down barriers in the

The Department of Education and the Secr

et Service have prepared a companion work to the Final

Report,

Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and Creating Safe School

Climates

. This guide is scheduled for publication in May 2002. The guide will include r

ecommendations for

investigating and evaluating threats and other behaviors of concern in school; address considerations for

developing policies and the capacity to support threat assessment efforts in schools; and provide

suggestions for appr

oaches schools can adopt to foster school envir

onments that r

educe violence.

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characteristics, behaviors, features or traits with prior school shooters does not help

in determining whether that student is thinking about or planning for a violent act.

The use of profiles in this way likewise is not an effective approach to identifying

students who may pose a risk for targeted school violence at school or for assessing

the risk that a particular student may pose for a school-based attack, once a

particular student has been identified. Reliance on profiles to predict future school

attacks carries two substantial risks: (1) the great majority of students who fit any

given profile of a "school shooter" will not actually pose a risk of targeted violence;

and, (2) using profiles will fail to identify some students who in fact pose a risk of

violence but share few if any characteristics with prior attackers.

Rather than trying to determine the "type" of student who may engage in targeted

school violence, an inquiry should focus instead on a student’s

behaviors and

communications to determine if that student appears to be planning or preparing for

an attack. Rather than asking whether a particular student "looks like" those who

have launched school-based attacks before, it is more productive to ask whether the

student is engaging in behaviors that suggest preparations for an attack, if so how

fast the student is moving toward attack, and where intervention may be possible.

Key Finding 5

Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others

concern or indicated a need for help.

Implications

Several key findings point to the fact that kids send signals–both directly and

indirectly–to others regarding their problems. The boys who engaged in the targeted

school violence examined by the

Safe School Initiative were not "invisible" students.

In fact nearly all of these students engaged in behaviors--prior to their attacks--that

caused concern to at least one person, usually an adult, and most concerned at least

three people.

This finding highlights the range of behaviors in a student’s life that may be

noticeable and that could prompt some additional probing by a caring adult. A

student’s family, teachers, friends and others may have information regarding aspects

of a student’s behavior that has raised concern. As was true in some of the incidents

covered in this study, individuals in contact with the attacker may have observed

something of concern about that student’s behavior, but not of sufficient concern for

them to notify anyone in a position to respond.

HAPTER IV- IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE FINDINGS

Educators and other adults can learn how to pick up on these signals and make

appropriate referrals.

By inquiring about any information that may have prompted

some concern, an investigator may be able to develop a more comprehensive picture

of the student’s past and current behavior, and identify any indications that the

student is intent on or planning to attack. However, discretion should be exercised

in determining whom to talk to about the student, so as not to alienate or stigmatize

the student of concern. A significant challenge facing schools is to determine how

best to respond to students who are already known to be in trouble or needing

assistance.

Key Finding 6

Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures.

Many had considered or attempted suicide.

Implications

Many students, not just those who engaged in school-based attacks, experience or

perceive major losses in their lives. Most students who face a significant loss, or who

have difficulty coping with such a loss, are not going to be at risk for a school-based

attack. However, information that indicates a student is facing or having trouble

dealing with a significantly difficult situation may indicate a need to refer the student

to appropriate services and resources.

In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may engage in

targeted violence, attention should be given to any indication that a student is having

difficulty coping with major losses or perceived failures, particularly where these

losses or failures appear to have prompted feelings of desperation and hopelessness.

An inquiry also should anticipate changes in the life of a troubled student, and

consider whether these changes might increase–or decrease–the threat the student

poses.

Key Finding 7

Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.

Implications

Bullying was not a factor in every case, and clearly not every child who is bullied in

school will pose a r

isk f

or t

argeted violence in school. Nevertheless, in a number of

the incidents of targeted school violence studied, attackers described being bullied in

terms that suggested that these experiences approached torment. These attackers

Please refer to Reddy et al. (2001), "Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk

assessment, threat assessment, and other approaches," for a full discussion of assessment approaches

currently available to schools. The full citation for the article is listed in Appendix C of this document.

See "Early Warning, Timely Response," listed in Appendix C of this report, for more information about

how to identify students who may need assistance.

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told of behaviors that, if they occurred in the workplace, likely would meet legal

definitions of harassment and/or assault.

The prevalence of bullying found in this and other recent studies should strongly

support ongoing efforts to reduce bullying in American schools.

Educators can play

an important role in ensuring that students are not bullied in schools and that

schools not only do not permit bullying but also empower other students to let adults

in the school know if students are being bullied.

Key Finding 8

Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

Implications

Access to weapons among some students may be common. However, when the idea

of an attack exists,

any effort to acquire, prepare, or use a weapon or ammunition

may be a significant move in the attacker’s progression from idea to action. Any

inquiry should include investigation of and attention to weapon access and use and

communications about weapons. Attention should also be given to indications of any

efforts by a student to build a bomb or acquire bomb-making components.

The large proportion of attackers who acquired their guns from home points to the

need for schools and law enforcement officials to collaborate on policies and

procedures for responding when a student is thought to have a firearm in school. In

particular, schools should be aware of the provisions of the Federal Gun-Free

Schools Act, which requires that all schools expel students who bring a gun to school

and should report all violations to local law enforcement officials.

Key Finding 9

In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.

Implications

This finding highlights the importance of considering what prompting or

encouragement a student may receive from others in his life that influences his

intent, planning, or preparations for a potential attack. Any investigation of potential

targeted school violence should include attention to the role that a student’s friends

or peers may be playing in that student’s thinking about and preparations for an

HAPTER IV- IMPLICATIONS OF SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE FINDINGS

attack. It is possible that feedback from friends or others may help to move a

student from an unformed thought about attacking to developing and advancing a

plan to carry out the attack.

Key Finding 10

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means

other than law enforcement intervention, and most were brief in duration.

Implications

The short duration of most incidents of targeted school violence argues for the

importance of developing preventive measures in addition to any emergency planning

for a school or school district. The preventive measures should include protocols

and procedures for responding to and managing threats and other behaviors of

concern.

See, for example, Nansel, T., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R., Ruan, J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. (2001).

Bullying behavior among U.S. youth.

Journal of the American Medical Association, 285

, pp. 2094-2100.

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,

Title IV, Part A, Subpart 3, Section 4141.

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HAPTER V- CONCLUSION: A PROMISING STRATEGY

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: THREAT

ASSESSMENT AS A PROMISING

STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING

SCHOOL VIOLENCE

HAPTER V- CONCLUSION: THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A PROMISING STRATEGY

Taken together, the findings from the Safe School Initiative suggest that some future

attacks may be preventable. Most incidents of targeted school violence were thought

out and planned in advance. The attackers’ behavior suggested that they were

planning or preparing for an attack. Prior to most incidents, the attackers’ peers

knew the attack was to occur. And most attackers were not "invisible," but already

were of concern to people in their lives.

In light of these findings, the use of a threat assessment approach may be a

promising strategy for preventing a school-based attack. Educators, law enforcement

officials and others with public safety responsibilities may be able to prevent some

incidents of targeted school violence if they know what information to look for and

what to do with such information when it is found. In sum, these officials may

benefit from focusing their efforts on formulating strategies for preventing these

attacks in two principal areas:

• developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable

information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack;

and,

• employing the results of these risk evaluations or "threat assessments" in

developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.

Threat Assessment and Targeted School Violence Prevention

Threat assessment, as developed by the Secret Service and applied in the context of

targeted school violence, is a fact-based investigative and analytical approach that

focuses on what a particular student is doing and saying, and not on whether the

student "looks like" those who have attacked schools in the past. Threat assessment

emphasizes the importance of such behavior and communications for identifying,

evaluating and reducing the risk posed by a student who may be thinking about or

planning for a school-based attack. The Department of Education and the Secret

Service currently are completing work on a publication that will provide school

administrators and law enforcement officials with guidance on planning and

implementing a threat assessment approach within school settings.

In relying on a fact-based threat assessment approach, school officials, law

enforcement professionals and others involved in the assessment will need tools,

mechanisms and legal processes that can facilitate their efforts to gather and analyze

information regarding a student’s behavior and communications. For example,

school and law enforcement personnel should be offered training regarding what

information to gather, how to gather and evaluate it, and how they might try to

intervene in cases where the information collected suggests a student may be

planning or preparing for a school-based attack.

Supra

note 25.

AFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE

INAL REPORT

Several states have enacted legislation that makes it easier for schools to share

student information with law enforcement agencies and others who are trying to

determine whether a student might be moving toward a school-based attack.

Localities and states may wish to explore such options for supporting threat

assessment components in schools and facilitating sharing information across school,

law enforcement and community systems participating in the threat assessment

process.

Finally, educators can play a part in prevention by creating an environment where

students feel comfortable telling an adult whenever they hear about someone who is

considering doing harm to another person, or even whether the person is

considering harming themselves. Once such an environment is created, it will remain

important that the adults in that environment listen to students and handle the

information they receive in a fair and responsible manner.

See "Legal Issues" in Appendix C of this report for listings of documents that include descriptions of state

statutes in this area.

PPENDIX

Appendix A

INCIDENTS OF

TARGETED SCHOOL

VIOLENCE, BY STATE

Appendix B

INCIDENTS OF

TARGETED SCHOOL

VIOLENCE, BY YEAR

Appendix C

RESOURCES

Contact

Information

ppendix A - INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE, BY STATE

INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

BY STATE

STATE TOWN OR COUNTY

Alabama Lanett

Alaska Bethel

Arkansas Jonesboro, Stamps

California Anaheim, Napa, Olivehurst, Palo Alto, Redlands

Colorado Jefferson County (Littleton)

Florida Lake Worth

Georgia Conyers, Scottsdale

Idaho Notus

Iowa Manchester

Kansas Goddard

Kentucky Grayson, Union, West Paducah

Massachusetts Great Barrington

Mississippi Pearl

Missouri DeKalb, Patterson

Montana Lewistown

New Mexico Deming

New York Olean

North Carolina Greensboro

Oklahoma Fort Gibson

Oregon Springfield

Pennsylvania Edinboro

Sout

h Carolina Blacksville

ennessee Fayetteville, Lynville

Texas Austin

Virginia Virginia Beach

ashingt

Moses Lak

Wisconsin Wauwatosa

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INAL REPORT

ppendix B - INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE, BY YEAR

INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE,

BY YEAR

YEAR MONTH AND DAY

1974 December 30

1978 May 18, October 15

1985 January 21

1986 December 4

1987 March 2

1988 December 14

1989 October 5

1992 May 1, May 14, December 14

1993 January 18, December 1

1994 May 26, October 12, November 8

1995 January 23, October 12, November 15

1996 February 2, February 8, March 25, September 25

1997 February 19, October 1, December 1, December 15

1998 March 24, April 24, May 19, May 24

1999 April 16, April 20, May 20, November 19, December 6

2000 May 26

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ppendix C - RESOURCES

RESOURCES

Boys and Violence

Pollack, W. (1998). Real boys: Rescuing our sons from the myths of boyhood.

New York: Henry Holt, Inc.

Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. (2001).

Real boys workbook. New York: Villard.

Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. (2000). Real boys’ voices. New York: Random House.

Legal Issues

Medaris, M.L., Campbell, E., & James, B. (1997, June). Sharing information: A

guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and participation in juvenile

justice programs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile

Justice and Delinquency Prevention and U.S. Department of Education, Family Policy

Compliance Office.

Slayton, J. (2000, March). Establishing and maintaining interagency information

sharing.

JAIBG Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

Thomerson, J. (2001, May).

School violence: Sharing student information.

Denver, Colo.: National Conference of State Legislatures.

Related Research

Borum, R. (2000). Assessing violence risk among youth. Journal of Clinical

Psychology

, 56, 1263-1288.

Dwyer, K., Osher, D., & Wagner, C. (1998).

Early warning, timely response: A

guide to safe schools

. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education.

Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B.V. (1999). Assassination in the United States: An

operational study of recent assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers. Journal

of Forensic Sciences, 44

, 321-333. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

Threat Assessment

Borum, R., Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Berglund, J. (1999). Threat assessment:

Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence. Behavioral Sciences &

the Law, 17, 323-337. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B. (1998). Protective intelligence & threat assessment

investigations: A guide for state and local law enforcement officials

(NIJ/OJP/DOJ

Publication No. 170612). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Available

at http://www

.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

ein, R.A., V

ossekuil, B., & Holden, G.A. (1995, September). Threat

assessment

: An appr

oach t

o prevent targeted violence.

ational Ins

titut

e of Justice:

Research in Action

, 1-7. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

Reddy, M., Borum, R., Berglund, J., Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., & Modzeleski, W.

(2001). Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk assessment,

eat assessment, and o

ther approaches.

Psy

hology in t

he Schools, 38

, 1

7-1

72.

vailable at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

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INAL REPORT

Web Sites

United States Department of Education . . . . . . . . . .www.ed.gov

United States Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .www.secretservice.gov

ONTACT INFORMATION

CONTACT INFORMATION

United States Secret Service United States Department of Education

National Threat Assessment Center Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program

950 H Street NW, Suite 9100 400 Maryland Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20223 Washington, DC 20202-6123

Phone: 202-406-5470 Phone: 202-260-3954

Fax: 202-406-6180 Fax: 202-260-7767

Web site: www.secretservice.gov/ntac Web site: www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS

ONTACT INFORMATION

U.S. Department of Education

Rod Paige

Secretary

Office of Safe And Drug-Free Schools

Deborah Price

Deputy Under Secretary

William Modzeleski

Associate Deputy

U.S. Secret Service

W. Ralph Basham

Director

Office of Protective Research

Michael Stenger

Assistant Director

National Threat Assessment Center

Matthew Doherty

Special Agent in Charge

First printed in May 2002. Revised in May 2004.

This report is in the public domain. Authorization to reproduce it in whole or in

part is granted. While permission to reprint this publication is not necessary, the

citation should be: Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W.,

The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the

Prevention of School Attacks in the United States. U.S. Department of Education,

Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Safe and Drug-Free Schools

Program and U.S. Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center, Washington,

D.C., 2002.

To order copies of this report,

write to:

ED Pubs, Education Publications Center, U.S. Department of Education,

P.O. Box 1398, Jessup, MD 20794-1398;

fax your request to: (301) 470-1244;

or email your request to: edpubs@inet.ed.gov or [email protected].

call in your request toll-free: 1-877-433-7827 (1-800-4-ED-Pubs). If 877 service is

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not yet available in your area, call 1-800-872-5327 (1-800-USA-LEARN). Those who

use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) or a teletypewriter (TTY),

should call 1-800-437-0833.

order online at: www.ed.gov/pubs/edpubs.html.

This report is also available on the Department of Education’s Web site at:

www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS and the U.S. Secret Service Web site at:

www.secretservice.gov/ntac.

On request, this publication is available in alternate formats, such as Braille, large

print, audiotape, or computer diskette. For more information, please contact the

Department of Education’s Alternate Format Center (202) 260-9895 or (202) 205-

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